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Abstract 
The paper examines the experience of sustainability partnerships for the management of 
coastal resources in Tanzania. It identifies key actors and governance dynamics, with focus on 
decentralization processes, legitimacy-building and participation of local communities. The 
paper first provides a brief status of coastal resources in Tanzania and a historical overview of 
the evolution of co-management practices. Then, it examines actors and processes at the 
national and local levels in relation to two types of co-management: Marine Parks (MPAs) and 
Beach Management Units (BMUs). In view of ongoing research under the New Partnerships 
for Sustainability project (NEPSUS), it provides guidance on research gaps in specific relation 
to the Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP) and selected BMUs in Mtwara 
region, Southern Tanzania.  
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1. Introduction  
Important coastal resources in Tanzania include fisheries, mangrove and coral. Although 
fisheries are the most exploited coastal resource, mangrove and coral are equally important as 
they provide important habitat and source of food for fish and other aquatic resources. 
Fisheries is a key sector and main source of livelihood and food security for coastal populations 
in Tanzania. The sector contributes to 1.6% of GDP, with a vast share of the catch coming from 
inland fisheries. Exploitation of marine fisheries is largely restricted to territorial waters (less 
than 12 miles from shore). Despite having a large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Tanzanian 
fishers have not had access to an adequate fishing fleet for deep sea exploitation in the EEZ.  
The Tanzanian coastline extends for approximately 1,400 km from 4° 49’ North at the border 
with Kenya to 10° 28’ South at the border with Mozambique. The coastal1 plain is narrow, 
occupying the Eastern seaboard of the Indian Ocean. Five administrative regions are found 
along the mainland coastal strip: Tanga, Pwani, Dar es Salaam, Lindi and Mtwara. The islands 
of Zanzibar consist of three regions in Unguja and two regions in Pemba.   The marine territorial 
sea constitutes an area of 64,000 km2 and the EEZ2 is approximately 223,000 km2. Several 
permanent and seasonal rivers, and numerous creeks traverse the coastal plains. The 
permanent rivers discharging into the Indian Ocean are the Pangani, Wami, Ruvu, Rufiji, 
Matandu, Mbemkuru, Lukuledi and Ruvuma (Nhnyete and Mahongo, 2017). The continental 
shelf is narrow and steep, covering a total surface area of about 17,900 km2. It is characterised 
by fringing coral reefs, seagrass and island habitats. The coastline is affected by the monsoon 
regime, with two typical seasons: the southeast monsoon (kusi) from May to early September, 
and the northeast monsoon (kaskazi) from November to March. 
Marine fisheries in Tanzania include artisanal multi-species gear fisheries and coastal shrimp 
trawl – both targeting fisheries resources within mostly territorial waters. Some foreign fishing 
fleets operate in the EEZ which extends up to 200 nm from the shoreline. A shoreline is defined 
as the interface between the land and the sea (Moore, 2000). In Tanzania, as in other countries 
of the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region, the shoreline and its adjoining coastal areas 
constitute valuable a resource. Accordingly, its management requires a thorough 
understanding of the dynamic of shoreline change, particularly the processes and implications 
of coastal erosion (Cooper and McKenna, 2008).  Fishing activities that could yield substantial 
catch in water depths of less than 500 m on coastal areas are limited.  
Marine fisheries contribute to about 10-15% of the total fishing production in Tanzania (Lee 
and Namisi, 2016).  Contributions from aquaculture, with the exception of seaweed farming, is 
minimal. Fishery catches in Tanzania are dominated by inland fisheries, with an average of 85% 
of the national fish catch, mainly from Lake Victoria and to a lesser extent Lake Tanganyika 
																																								 																				
1 Morphologically, the coastline is straight and bounded by sandy, open beaches and cliff out-
cropping in the south. There are extensive mangrove forests in the riverine estuaries and deltas 
especially along Rufiji, Pangani and Ruvuma rivers. 
2 In 2012, the United Republic of Tanzania applied to the Commission on the Limits of Continental 
Shelf under UNCLOS to extend its EEZ by 61,000 km2.  
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(Breuil and Grima, 2014). Several studies show that coastal marine resources of special 
significance are composed of small and medium pelagics, demersal fish in deep water and 
coral reef areas, and lagoons and intertidal species. Small pelagics include scads, herring and 
anchovy. Medium pelagics include Spanish mackerel, bonito, barracuda, mackerel and wolf 
herring (Jiddawi and Öhman, 2002; Muhando and Rumisha, 2008). Demersal species include 
different species of shark, ray, skate, sole, catfish, and shrimp. Coral reef fish species include 
emperor, snapper, sweetlips, parrotfish, surgeonfish, rabbitfish, grouper and goatfish. The 
lagoon and intertidal pond species include octopus, squid, crabs and a variety of bivalves. 
There is also an artisanal fishery targeting tuna and tuna-like species within Tanzanian EEZ 
(Breuil and Grima, 2014; Division of Fisheries, 2012).  
Current fish catches are estimated at approximately 340,000 MT per year, excluding catches 
of tuna and tuna-like species by Distant Water Fleet Nations (DWFN) in the EEZ. The 
development of the fishery sector is advanced, especially in inland waters.  Marine fishing is 
limited to the near shore due to lack of a domestic fleet of deep sea fishing vessels. The status 
of marine resources is unclear due to lack of data. Nonetheless, national authorities have often 
reported that the potential of marine fishery in inshore waters is around 100,000 MT per 
annum. However, this is based on stock assessments conducted in the early 1980s. There are 
no estimates of the fish potential in the EEZ (Breuil and Girma, 2014). Frame surveys which are 
undertaken to provide official statistics on fisheries are not carried out regularly, due to lack of 
funding. Official statistics rely on a few surveys which have been successfully performed: the 
2009 frame survey reports 36,320 fishers on the coastline of Tanzania, of which 7,000 were 
operating without vessels (‘foot fishers’). Other surveys reported 36,323 fishers in 2014, and 
48,529 in 2016 (URT, 2016). It is not clear how reliable these assessments are.  Catch statistics 
suggest that they have been declining in volume, but increasing in value due to supply 
shortages arising from destructive fishing activities and environmental change. Figure 1 
provides a snapshot catch statistics in marine waters in Tanzania in the past 40 years. 
In a companion paper (Kweka et al. 2017), we highlighted that there are two main forms of co-
management in the governance of coastal resources: Marine Parks (MPAs) and Beach 
Management Units (BMUs). There are three MPAs in Tanzania: the Mafia Island Marine Park 
(MIMP), established in 1995; the Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP), 
established in 2000; and the Tanga Coelacanth Marine Park (TCMP), established in 2009. In 
this paper, we provide a brief background on MIMP and TCMP, but focus especially on 
MBREMP. BMUs have been established in Tanzania in the past two decades, first in inland 
waters and then in coastal areas with fishing activities. In the past few years, WWF has started 
to facilitate the formation of Cooperative Fishery Management Areas (CFMA), which combine 
several BMUs. This paper is mainly informed by a review of empirical and background 
information on these initiatives in Tanzania, and preliminary fieldwork including interviews with 
key informants and main stakeholders in Dar es Salaam and Mtwara in January-March 2017. 
Further fieldwork and a survey will provide additional results as the project progresses.  
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Fig. 1 Production trends for marine fisheries (1980-2016). Source: Fisheries statistics (MALF) for various 
years 
The next section discusses the historical evolution of management of coastal resources from 
the colonial era. The third section describes the institutions and policies guiding the 
management of coastal resources in the country. The fourth and fifth sections provides some 
background information on MBREMP and selected BMUs in Mtwara rural district. The final 
section highlights the existing research gaps and informs the future activities of NEPSUS in this 
realm.  
 
2. The Institutional and Regulatory Framework for the Management of Coastal 
Resources in Tanzania 
 
Unlike terrestrial resources, coastal resources in Tanzania began to receive significant 
attention only in the past three decades. Management of terrestrial resources—wildlife and 
forests—were addressed with considerable attention and rules during the colonial era. In the 
immediate post-independence period, Tanzania continued to apply colonial laws and 
regulations on natural resources. Since no concerted efforts were undertaken on coastal 
resources, they were particularly exposed to overexploitation and degradation, leading to 
adverse effects on livelihoods (Ruitenbeek et al., 2005). The fisheries legislation that existed 
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during the early independence period was not sufficient to fend off the quick growth of 
catches in the fishing sector. Although in the 1970s the government had established the first 
marine reserve, it was not until 1994 when the government enacted the Marine Parks and 
Reserves Act, followed by the establishment in 1995 of the first MPA, the Mafia Island Marine 
Park. Numerous other efforts also began in the early 1990s, when the government with 
assistance from donors started to tackle coastal and marine resources problems using the 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) approach (TCMP, 1999), coupled with its 
National Integrated Coastal Management Policy of 2003. In tandem with ICZM, various 
government initiatives were undertaken by the National Environment Management Council 
(NEMC) under a programme known as Tanzania Coastal Management Partnership (TCMP).  
 
The institutional framework for management of coastal resources in Tanzania comprises 
many actors and institutions, leading to conflicting interesting and unnecessary overlap 
(Gustavson et al., 2009). Different line ministries have applied their powers towards coastal 
resources, such as the Division of the Environment of the Vice President’s Office, the National 
Environmental Management Council (NEMC), which is largely a watchdog for compliance, 
sectorial ministries such as the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, the Ministry of Energy, as well as local government authorities. 
Currently, at the national level, two ministries are responsible for overall management and 
coordination of this sector: the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MALF) 
through the Department of Fisheries Development, as concerns the management of inland 
and marine fisheries within the territorial waters of Mainland Tanzania; and the Ministry of 
Natural Resources, Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MNALF) for the management of the 
territorial waters of Zanzibar.  
Mangroves represent an ecosystem of ecological and economical significance for Tanzania. 
For years, mangroves were managed as forest, but this did not prevent their over-exploitation 
by coastal communities (Semesi, 1992, 1988). Although the Tanzanian government has 
maintained the protected status of mangroves as territorial reserves, evidence shows that it has 
failed to manage them as well as it has managed terrestrial forest reserves.  Placing the 
management of mangroves under forestry makes it difficult to handle coastal resources 
holistically. Unlike mangroves, coral reefs which support diverse marine ecosystems in 
Tanzanian waters, including over 500 species of commercially important fish and invertebrates, 
are regulated through fisheries regulations, and especially the Fisheries Act of 2003 and the 
Marine Parks and Reserves Act of 1994.   
The National Fisheries Policy (2015) 
The legal and regulatory framework that governs the fisheries sector consists of a number of 
laws and regulations. An important one is the National Fisheries Policy of 2015, which sets out 
to transform fisheries into a sector contributing significantly to socio-economic development. 
As stated in its vision, ‘the overall objective of the National Policy is to develop a robust, 
competitive and efficient fisheries sector that contributes to food security and nutrition, growth 
NEPSUS Working Paper 2017/5 
	
8	
of the national economy, and improvement of the wellbeing of fisheries stakeholders while 
conserving the environment’3. 
The National Environmental Policy (NEP, 1997) 
This policy is relevant because it places emphasis on the adoption of management practices 
to ensure the environmentally sustainable use of natural resources. In a way, it echoes the spirit 
of provision 9(1)(c) of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) constitution, which states the need 
to ensure the harnessing and preservation of natural resources for the common good. Another 
important piece of legislation that supports the implementation of NEP (1997) is the 
Environment Management Act (EMA, 2004), which ‘provides a legal and institutional framework 
for the sustainable management of the environment’ (Kuboja, 2013). 
The Fisheries Act No. 22 (2003) 
This Act, which repealed and replaced the Fisheries Act of 1970, applies to Mainland Tanzania. 
Besides providing general provisions, the Act imposes sovereignty over biological resources 
belonging to the Government as  follows: ‘all biological resources and their intangible 
products whether naturally occurring or naturalized within fisheries including genetic 
resources belonging to the Government in accordance with Article 27 of the Constitution, shall 
be conserved and utilized for the people of this country in accordance with the provisions of 
this Act and any other written law on biological resources.’4 Other areas of focus include 
emphasis on the need to carry out Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), define research 
priority areas and facilitation, and penalties for offences. The Act also makes provisions for 
sustainable development, protection, conservation, aquaculture development, regulation and 
control of fish, fish products, aquatic flora and its products. Plans are underway to prepare new 
regulations for implementing the Fisheries Act. No. 22 of 2003. The MALF has also kick-started 
the process of establishing a National Fisheries Cooperation to oversee the envisaged National 
Fleet.5 
The Marine Parks and Reserve Act (No. 29 of 1994) 
This Act and the Marine Parks Reserves (Declaration) Regulations of 19996 are the main legal 
instruments that provide guidelines on the operation of Marine Parks (MPAs) in Mainland 
Tanzania. Furthermore, they outline roles and responsibilities of stakeholders and community 
members involved in the fisheries sector. The Act has recently been reviewed and 
recommendations have been forwarded to the Government for consideration. The MPAs 
operate under the Marine Parks and Reserve Unit (MPRU) within the Department of Fisheries 
Development of the MALF. MPAs are a relatively new concept in Tanzania. Before their 
establishment, there were only terrestrial parks targeting forest, wildlife and wetland 
																																								 																				
3 Section 2.1 of the National Fisheries Policy, 2015. 
4 The Fisheries Act. No. 22 of 2003, section 51 (1)). 
5 Budget Speech by the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, May 2016. 
6 See Government Notice No. 85 of 1999. 
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conservation. Currently, there are three marine parks in Mafia (gazzetted in 1995), Mtwara 
(2002) and Tanga (2009), and about 15 Marine Reserve Units. Reserve units are designated as 
‘no-take-zones’, while MPAs have three different zones: a ‘core zone’ (no-take-zone), a ‘specific 
zone’, and a ‘general use zone’. Generally, no activities are allowed in the core zone. Core zones 
are critical areas rich in biodiversity and they are protected to ensure spill-over effect. In specific 
zones, resource use is set aside exclusively for people living within the MPA, whereas general 
use zones are also open (under permission) to people living outside the park.  
The Tanzania Fisheries Research Institute (Act. No. 11, 2016) 
Another key institution is the Tanzania Fisheries Research Institute (TAFIRI). TAFIRI is a 
parastatal organization established in 1980 by the Tanzania Fisheries Institute Act Cap. 280.  In 
2016, the Parliament passed the Tanzania Fisheries Research Institute Act No. 11 
(Commencement Date Notice), which was gazetted in a government notice No. 128 of 2017. 
Headquartered in Dar es Salaam, and with offices in Mwanza, Kigoma and Kyela, the institute 
undertakes research in various areas of interest to the sector, including fresh water and marine 
capture fisheries, aquaculture and mariculture technologies, stock and catch assessment, fish 
processing and quality as well as socio-economic studies (URT 2016). TAFIRI is currently 
engaged in a physio-chemical parameters project which employs satellite data. Two satellite 
dishes are being piloted in Mafia. 
The Deep-Sea Fishing Authority (Amendment Act No. 17 of 2007) 
This Act is an amendment to the Deep-Sea Fishing Authority Act Cap 388 of 2009, which guides 
the activities and operations of the Deep Sea Fishing Authority (DSFA). The DSFA, which is a 
joint creation of MALF and MNALF, has been entrusted with the responsibility of managing 
fisheries resources and related activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the URT. The 
DFSA is located in Zanzibar. Among the important amendments inserted in the Act No. 17 of 
2007 are: the introduction of a Secretariat of the Executive Committee to be headed by the 
Director-General;7 the sharing of the posts of Director-General and Deputy-Director General 
between Tanzania Mainland and Tanzania Zanzibar,8 with tenure of office of the two officials to 
be limited to three years. These were among the contentious issues that had previously 
beleaguered the DFSA. It is also important to note that the MALF has reviewed the Deep-Sea 
Fishing Authority Regulations, which were gazetted in Government Notice No. 323 of 20169. 
 
 
																																								 																				
7 Section 5A (1) of Act 17, 2007. 
8 Section 7(d) (4). 
9 See Hotuba ya Waziri wa Kilimo, Mifugo na Uvuvi, Mh. Eng. Dr. Charles John Tizeba (MB.) Kuhusu 
Makadirio ya Mapato na Matumizi ya Fedha ya Wizara ya Kilimo, Mifugo na Uvuvi kwa Mwaka 2017/2018.  
NEPSUS Working Paper 2017/5 
	
10	
3.  The Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP)  
3.1 General background and brief history 
Mnazi Bay and the Ruvuma Estuary were identified as priority areas for the conservation of 
global marine biodiversity in 1995. The Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP) was 
gazetted in 2000 by the Tanzanian government as the second marine park established in 
Tanzania after Mafia Island Marine Park (MIMP) (Government Notice No. 285, published on 
4/8/2000). It began operations in 2002, with support by UNDP/GEF and the Fonds Francais 
Pour l’Environnnment Mondial (FFEM).  
MBREMP is a multi-use MPA situated in Mtwara rural district, on Tanzania’s southern border 
with Mozambique. MBREMP is at the center of the East Africa Marine Ecoregion and where the 
South Equatorial Current meets the East African mainland (Obura, 2004).  Coral reefs in 
MBREMP extend for some 62 km from the Ruvuma estuary to Msangamkuu Point, enclosing a 
bay that varies in size from 67 to 150 km2 at low and high tides, respectively.  The bay is 
enclosed by sandy shores to the west and the Ruvula-Msimbati spit and a string of rock islands 
and reefs to the east, with only major deep channel, the Ruvula channel in the south, and a 
smaller reef gap in the northern part of Mnazi Bay.  Due to its high degree of closure and 
geometry, the bay experiences very high tidal currents (up to 6 knots) and a complex range of 
coral reef and other habitats. The Ruvula channel itself is an unusual feature for East African 
reefs, as there are few locations in the region with such a large bay fed by a narrow, deep 
channel.  
Human population density around the park is high. The project document for MBREMP in 2000 
highlighted that there were 17 villages within the boundary of the protected area, with a 
population of 30,000 people and an average per capita income of under $100 per year (UNDP 
2000).  This population imposes significant pressures on MBREMP and its biological resources, 
principally through fishing, coral mining and other forms of extraction. In addition, the town of 
Mtwara is located just north of the park, and is a significant port and provincial urban center, 
with additional threats coming from shipping and other economic activities to marine 
environments.  The existence of natural gas in the sedimentary sands beneath Mnazi Bay are 
the focus of current investments to extract the gas and pipe it to Mtwara, with potential future 
threats to the marine environments in the bay (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 
2005). 
Reports show that Mtwara region was chosen for the development of a Marine Park for a 
number of reasons (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2005): the area contains good 
representative examples of all the marine habitats found along the shores of Eastern Africa; it 
has highly productive and diverse fisheries under threat, which are important for local 
residents; and it holds promise for coastal tourism. The presence of natural gas reserves 
within this area further justified the need for instituting sustainable management of marine 
resources which an MPA could offer. A snapshot of the steps that resulted into the 
establishment of MBREMP is highlighted in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Summary events in the establishment of the MBREMP (adapted from Katikiro et al., 
2015) 
Date Event Major milestone 
1994 Initiation of the first marine environment 
protection programme (MEPP) following a 
meeting in Sudi village to discuss problems 
related to the marine environment. The 
meeting is attended by 40 fishermen from 12 
villages, four local government officials, 
police from Kilwa, Lindi and Mtwara districts 
and two consultants from RIPS.  
Formation of the Sudi committee 
(which gave rise to SHIRIKISHO). 
Establishment of patrols to monitor 
dynamite fishing. 
Introduction of seaweed farming 
with financial support from RIPS. 
1994-1999 Studies carried out by the University of Dar 
es Salaam (Institute of Marine Science), in 
collaboration with Frontier-Tanzania to 
provide baseline information for the 
development of an MPA in Mtwara district 
Biophysical and socio-economic 
data collected. 
1996 A second workshop with 80 participants is 
held in Msimbati village to review 
developments since the Sudi workshop. 
Three members of Parliament, in addition to 
district councilors and senior police officers 
attend. 
Decision to expand the MEPP and 
aim to formulate and implement 
community-based coastal zone 
management in Kilwa, Lindi and 
Mtwara districts. MEPP is facilitated 
by RIPS, with technical support from 
Frontier-Tanzania. 
1998-1999 A series of discussions in Mtwara district are 
held, concerning the need to protect marine 
habitats and improve fisheries management. 
Promotion of the need to accelerate 
the establishment of an MPA. 
1998 Drafting of a constitution and conditions for 
membership for SHIRIKISHO (which started 
as a committee of 12 people). 
Formal registration of SHIRIKISHO as 
an NGO, becoming ‘The Southern 
Zone Confederation for Protection of 
the Marine Environment’. 
1999 Mtwara Declaration signed.  
District authorities at both 
government and civil society level 
agree to the creation of a Marine 
National Park in the Mnazi Bay area. 
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2000 
An agreement is approved by the regional 
and then central government under the 
Marine Parks and Reserves legislation 
framework. 
MBREMP is recognized for its 
biodiversity value and is gazetted as 
Tanzania’s second MPA. 
Appointment of a Park Warden and 
members of staff. 
A technical advisor is hired by IUCN 
EARO. 
2002 
Management structure of MBREMP is put in 
place and the Park starts full operations 
under the financial grant of GEF/UNDP 
project. 
Village liaison committees are set up 
in each village, except in Mkubiru 
and Nalingu. 
Opposition against the marine park 
started to manifest. 
MBREMP initiates a series of meetings, 
conservation forums and workshops in 
villages to raise awareness and makes plans 
for the enactment of marine park 
committees in villages. 
Park managers assure that 
community participation will be 
legally mandated within the marine 
park and park will facilitate job 
creation through tourism and loans 
to improve fishing activities. 
Local communities become formally 
involved in deliberations over 
MBREMP through their 
representatives in the Advisory 
Committee. 
Draft Village Environmental Plans 
(VEMPs) developed for all villages, 
except in Nalingu and Mkubiru. 
2003 
The first marine park advisory committee is 
formed. 
Resistance spreads to Mkubiru as 
local community areworried about 
potential restrictions on their fishing 
practices. Other villages, especially 
Msimbati, acte in covert ways to 
increase resistance in other villages. 
2003-4 
Institutionalization of community 
participation by facilitating the development 
of VEMPs. 
Fears spread that MBREMP will 
prevent local community access to 
fishing and other marine resources. 
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2004 
Nalingu village resorts to overt forms of 
resistance against the implementation of 
MBREMP activities. 
Studies published on the 
knowledge base of marine 
biodiversity and socio-economic 
status of MBREMP. 
  A management plan document is 
produced and is sent to the Ministry 
for approval. 
2003-5 
Biophysical and socio-economic 
assessments are carried out in MBREMP. 
The concept of ‘Marine Park’ is so 
vague that all park stakeholders 
ostensibly agree to it. 
2005 
Workshops are held with stakeholders within 
the park, including national government 
officials, representatives of international 
NGOs, academics, district government 
officials, and village leaders of several 
villages to develop management plan of 
MBREMP.  
2006 
MBREMP residents are promised help in 
fishing activities and alternative income 
activities.  
	
MBREMP was established in 2000, after having been identified as an area of biodiversity value 
at both the national and international level (Kelleher et al. 1996). It encompasses an area of 
650 km2, of which 220 km2 is land. The remaining 430 km2 include mangrove forests, islands, 
and extensive coral reefs. The population living within the MBREMP area is currently estimated 
at approximately 40,000 people living in 17 villages. MBREMP is bordered by the Indian Ocean 
to the east, Mozambique to the south, Mtwara municipal to the north, and several hinterland 
villages of Mtwara district to the west (Katikiro et al., 2015a).  
The main official aim of the park is to combine conservation and sustainable development. The 
resources managed by the park include fish, mangrove, coral reef, seagrass beds and 
sandbanks. The main identified challenges are: overfishing, rapid population growth, 
emerging activities vis a vis exploration of natural gas and coastal development, dynamite 
fishing, collection of shell and sea cucumber, coral harvest, and coastal erosion. The current 
management plan recognizes the development of gas reserves in the area. The objectives of 
the park include the protection and promotion of sustainable use of resources through zoning 
and (at least in theory) the involvement of communities in its management. Through donor 
funds, several efforts were undertaken to attain a sustainable use of coastal and marine 
resources. These included an initiative to form a deep-sea fishing fleet under the support of 
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Coastal and Marine Environment Management Project10 (MACEMP). MACEMP also targeted 
the strengthening of co-management activities performed by BMUs and VLCs, and the 
development of livelihood activities, particularly fish farming (MACEMP, 2013). This was done 
to align with the goal of conservation with improving livelihoods. MACEMP also played a 
crucial role by supporting construction of MBREMP’s office and staff houses in Ruvula.   
3.2 Institutional setup and management system 
MBREMP operates under the Marine Parks and Reserves Unit (MPRU). MPRU is a semi-
autonomous organization under the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MALF). It 
is governed by a Board of Trustees, whose members are appointed by the Minister. MPRU was 
established under the then Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), but later it 
moved under MALF. According to the Marine Parks and Reserve Act No 29 of 1994, the 
management approach inherent in marine parks and reserves should be participatory. MPRU 
has thus attempted to develop a co-management arrangement with key stakeholders, 
including local communities, district and government authorities.  
At the time when MBREMP was financially supported by donor agencies (from its inception to 
2008), a Project Steering Committee oversaw its functioning – it included representatives from 
the Ministry, the Bank of Tanzania, the Office of the Vice-President, GEF, FFEM, UNDP, IUCN, 
Mtwara regional secretariat, Mtwara district council authorities, Shirikisho (an NGO), local 
community representatives, village advisory committee representatives, and local Members of 
Parliament. The committee is still formally existing, but it is only active when there is funding 
available for their meetings. The MBREMP Board of Trustees appoints representatives to the 
MP Advisory Committee for Mnazi Bay (MPAC). MPAC is supposed to include representatives 
from village councils, local NGOs, district authorities, and local businesses.  The day-by-day 
administration of MBREMP is carried out by the Warden in Charge, assisted by other MPA 
personnel (including a Community Conservation Warden, Park Rangers and administrative 
staff). Within the MBREMP area, each village is supposed to have a functioning Village Liaison 
Committee (VLCs) with eight community members. These are formally separate from the pre-
existing Village Environmental Committees (VECs). MBREMP is also supported by village-
based voluntary Honorary Rangers. There is no formal business representation in MBREMP.  
According to the 2011 MBREMP General Management Plan (GMP), the Marine Park has the 
following objectives:  
• Protect, conserve and restore species and genetic diversity of marine resources and 
ecosystem processes; 
• Promote sustainability of resource use and reclaim/recover those that have been over-
exploited; 
																																								 																				
10 MACEMP operated between 2005 and 2013 to strengthen the sustainable management and use of 
Tanzania’s Exclusive Economic Zone, territorial seas, and coastal resources. 
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• Ensure that resource users are involved in planning, development and management 
of the park, and that they: share the benefits of the park; have priority in resource 
access; and can draw benefits from other economic opportunities 
These objectives, in line with other contemporary approaches to marine protected areas, 
include conservation, sustainable resource use, and participation and benefit-sharing by local 
communities.  Although the GMP mentions benefit-sharing, it does not include livelihood 
diversification and the wellbeing of the affected community in its management objectives 
(MBREMP 2011: viii-ix). These issues are only mentioned in passing elsewhere in the text. And 
the only benefits explicitly mentioned are those coming from gas exploitation and eco-tourism. 
These are supposed to compensate for the curbing of existing economic activities (Ibid: ix). 
Much of the focus of the GMP is on ‘education’ of local communities (sometimes in fairly 
patronizing ways). The GMP mentions the existence of a ‘tourism investment framework’, but 
no tourism investments have been carried out so far in the MBREMP area. The MBREMP 
general management plan (GMP) was produced in 2005, with a revised version published in 
2011. While the MBREMP mid-term evaluation report (Gawler and Muhando, 2004) submitted 
to IUCN recommended that enforcement cannot be done without alternative income 
generating activities, the livelihood component in the GMP has remained vague.   
The area governed by MBREMP is characterized by three ecological zones: seafront, mangrove 
and riverine. It is also divided in three management zones (core, specified use, general use), 
plus a buffer zone around the land perimeter. The core zone is designated to provide the 
highest level of protection within the park. Within MBREMP, both marine and coastal forest 
habitats are represented within core zones. The specified use zone includes areas of the MPA 
that warrant primary conservation status, but which are also important to local community 
members for their own use. Some activities are specifically permitted in this zone, but only for 
designated beneficiaries, including an area set aside for gas extraction. The general use zone 
is intended to provide for the sustainable resource use by local residents. In such a way, the 
general user zone is supposed to compensate resource users from loss of access to zones with 
higher level of protection (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), 2005). Only 
activities that are not destructive and legally recognised are allowed in the general use zone. 
Additionally, users outside the park are allowed to carry out some activities, but they require 
permits to be issued at the village level. MBREMP residents have priority access to resources 
in general-use zones. The buffer zone lays outside but adjacent to the MPA: any new economic 
activity in such area needs to be approved following an environmental impact assessment. 
3.3 Participatory elements  
Village Liaison Committees (VLCs) in MBREMP have been promoted as community-based 
mechanisms that include a wide range of resource users, such as fishers, fish traders, mangrove 
cutters, gleaners, farmers, business, religious and traditional groups. The MBREMP General 
Management Plan (GMP) states that VLCs include representatives from villages that affect or 
are affected by the marine protected area. The inherent weakness of VLCs is that, instead of 
acting as the sole structures for communities to participate in the management of the MPA, 
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they emerged after major decisions had already been made by external agencies (Beaumont, 
1997; EcoAfrica Environmental Consultants, 2012).  
VLCs serve as primary liaison between communities and MPA management. Members of VLCs 
are elected by the village, with no more than 12 members selected by a village assembly for 
an official tenure of three years.  Members are eligible for re-election for a second term.  Once 
elected, they are supposed to be trained in basic aspects of marine conservation and in their 
specific roles in the MPA management. There is no specific requirement for elected members 
prior to participation in trainings. The training often depends on the availability of funds.  The 
VLCs have the responsibility to oversee the use of marine resources in their villages. The 
performance of VLCs, however, depends largely on whether they are supported by the MPA 
authorities. While in the Mafia Island Marine Park (MIMP), the VLCs are responsible for 
collecting camping and fishing fees from fishers visiting from outside the MIMP area, in 
MBREMP, they are mostly active in monitoring illegal fishing activities (EcoAfrica Environmental 
Consultants, 2012). 
In recent years, however, VLCs have remained virtually dormant. Evidence from preliminary 
fieldwork carried out in early 2017 suggests that they lack motivation to fulfil their duties, and 
that the reality behind family ties and social hierarchy in villages makes the unbiased and 
proper functioning of VLCs difficult. Ineffective execution of sustainable management of fishery 
resources by VLCs is also attributed to the limited impact they have had on fisher decisions to 
abide to regulations. Lack of adequate funding and resources needed for monitoring and 
control also hinder VLCs from controlling destructive fishing activities and other violations in 
their areas of jurisdiction. 
3.4 Insights on MBREMP from project documents and the existing literature 
At least during the period of external funding support (between 2002 and 2010), MBREMP had 
a functioning GIS unit, and carried out a monitoring program on coral reefs, fisheries, 
mangrove, whales and turtles.  Additionally, a strategic plan (Hardingham 2005) and baseline 
surveys were available from the early 2000s, including information on biophysical conditions 
(8 different baseline surveys/assessment) (Julius, 2005), on socio-economic conditions and 
occupational structure (Harrison, 2005; Malleret, 2004), and on ways of facilitating community 
contribution to the GMP (Hogan and Bashangi 2005). These studies will be used in future 
publications of the NEPSUS project to assess change in time in relation to key sustainability 
indicators.  
A mid-term evaluation in 2008 and the terminal evaluation of external support also provide 
important insights. The mid-term evaluation (Gawler and Muhando, 2004) highlighted that 
the MBREMP project had attained good success in establishing the knowledge base on 
biodiversity and that there was a good team in place to implement activities of the MPA. The 
report however, highlighted the danger of losing goodwill and support in the villages 
because of promises that had been made and went unfulfilled. As a way forward, the mid-
term report recommended a swiftly move that would ensure concrete benefits to local 
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people from the MPA. It also pointed out the need to amend administrative procedures, 
including allowing the project team to take full responsibility for implementing project 
activities instead of other partners.  The terminal evaluation, conducted in 2007 (Tortell and 
Ngatunga, 2007), highlighted that the MBREMP project had carried out virtually all planned 
activities and made substantial progress towards all the targeted outcomes. Overall, the 
report argued that the project had attained had been significant and satisfactory.  
In addition to these project documents, several studies have examined selected aspects of 
MBREMP. We summarize their main findings here, in order to highlight the research gaps we 
intend to address in the NEPSUS project. All the publications covered here are based on 
fieldwork that was carried out in the first half of the 2010s.  
Machumu and Yakupitiyage (2013) provide information on the status of fishery stocks and 
mangrove in the MBREMP area through perception data, supplemented by fish catch records 
at four landing sites (onsite collection, twice a week for two months, both in seafront and 
mangrove areas). The focus of their study is identifying the drivers of ecosystem change. 
Machumu and Yakupitiyage ran focus four groups in five selected villages (with women, youth, 
elders, and village leaders). All villages are located inside the marine park (Litembe, Tangazo, 
Kitunguli, Mahurunga, Mngoji, and Msimbati). They also carried out a household survey (with 
stratified random sampling by wealth cluster) and key informant interviews. They collected 
information on whether stakeholders comply with regulations, what benefits they derive from 
compliance, the effectiveness of management regime in reducing adverse impacts of human 
activity, and fish catches and incomes. Machumu and Yakupitiyage (2013: 378) find that 
MBREMP is ‘reasonably effective’ in managing drivers of ecosystem chance, and that local 
communities have benefited from increased fish catches and income. They find that awareness 
and compliance with regulations has improved, but that some anthropogenic drivers continue 
to threaten the sustainability of the MPA.  
Mangora et al. (2014) compare three villages located within MBREMP (Msimbati, Litembe, 
Mahuranga) and two outside (Naumbu, Msijute). Mangora et al. carried out focus groups with 
women, men and youth in each village, key informant interviews, and a survey covering assets, 
natural resource use and productive activity, income, expenditure and lifestyle, coping 
strategies and the role of the MPA. They argue that the MPA limits livelihood choices and 
activities without offering alternative benefits and safety nets – they show that villages outside 
the MPA are actually doing better than those inside. They also observe community resistance 
to MBREMP, highlight lack of community participation, and report accusations by villagers that 
MBREMP is seizing their user rights and tenure. They see no clear livelihood benefits arising 
from MBREMP, and no provision of extra social services or improvements that could be 
attributed to the MPA. They report that three pilot projects on alternative livelihoods had been 
established, but they were placed in interior villages, where the impact on restricting resource 
access is less severe than in coastal villages where opposition to MBREMP has been more 
marked. By the time of their fieldwork, these livelihood diversification projects seemed to have 
collapsed. Finally, they mention a planned ecotourism investment in Litembe and a general 
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lack of clarity among the communities living next to the entrance gate on how entry charges 
are collected and what they are used for. 
Mwanjela and Lokina's (2015) research took place in the first half of the 2010s, and targeted 
five villages, all within MBREMP (three seafront villages, and two interior villages). The focus of 
their study is on community participation (with data gathered mainly through a survey), which 
they find lacking. They highlight severe power struggles between the MPA and local 
communities in managing resources and in terms of distribution of benefits. Mwanjela and 
Lokina argue that donors had much stronger influence on the creation of MBREMP than the 
Tanzanian government or local communities. They highlight the severity of fishers’ main 
complaints: (1) dugout canoes cannot reach the fishing grounds further ashore, which are 
outside of the MBREMP area; and access to modern boats was promised but never 
materialized; (2) exchange of illegal fishing nets with legal nets never happened; and (3) 
alternative income activities never took off; some were based on activities that are not 
customary in the areas, such as beekeeping. Mwanjela and Lokina report conflicts over 
patrolling and the use of police force instead of park officers. At the community-level, they 
underline that Msimbati (the largest village within MBREMP) used to be a major trade centre – 
with important sales to octopus and sea cucumber, which are now protected by the MPA; and 
that women can no longer collect bivalves for own consumption. They conclude that 
community participation in MBREMP has been only rhetorical and claim that: village 
governments are more powerful than VECs; VECs are a loophole for village elites to capture 
benefits via meeting allowances; and communities are treated simply as recipients of MPA 
rules.  
Similar results are reported in previous studies by Mwanjela (2011), who highlights the 
negative impacts of restrictions to resource access, the confiscation of fishing gear, and the 
lack of delivery of promised benefits (gear, motorized boats, alternative livelihood initiatives) 
and by Kamat (2014), who shows the top down nature of implementation of activities by 
MBREMP, which led to an increase in structural violence and deepened inequality. Kamat 
(2014) argues that lack of tangible benefits, lack of consultation with villagers, and restricted 
access to resources is causing suffering, especially among female-headed households. This is 
more pronounced in coastal villages than in the interior.  
Robinson et al. (2012) take a managerial approach to addressing the limitations of MBREMP. 
Along with others, they argue that MPAs can only be successful if reliance on marine resources 
is decreased at the same time as meaningful alternatives emerge. They build a decision-
modelling framework to examine the implications of different incentives, the reactions to these 
incentives, and sustainable management through different enforcement tools, livelihood 
projects and fishing gear exchange programmes. They argue that offering the same package 
of incentives and alternative income project to all villages is problematic: most important for 
fishing villages is to find alternative activities, otherwise even gear confiscation and the 
enforcement of no fishing zones fail. They also claim that rewarding the more cooperative 
villages with projects is counter-productive, as more combative villages tend to be the ones 
where fishing is the main livelihood activity. 
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A series of studies carried out by Katikiro and colleagues also focused on MBREMP. Katikiro et 
al., (2015a) examine the limitations of MBREMP in moving from a state-led initiative towards a 
more ‘locally-managed marine area’ (LMMA). They argue that LMMAs in Tanzania are 
hampered by top-down procedures and lack of community involvement in their establishment. 
Marine park legislation is not clear on how NGOs and private stakeholders can be involved in 
management (although this is now under review). Katikiro et al. (2015a) focus on perceptions 
related to promoting local management and participation.  In their fieldwork, they covered 17 
villages, including two that have recently joined MBREMP (Mtendachi and Namidondi, located 
in the buffer area) and carried out a total of 193 household interviews and 17 focus groups. 
They report insufficient participation by ‘legitimate community representatives’ and strong 
interference in implementation from MPRU, IUCN Eastern Africa Marine Programme, 
UNDP/GEF and the French global environmental facility (FFEM). Community participation took 
place mainly at village-level at public meetings, with little representation at district-level 
meetings. They conclude that there has been a rapid increase in management of marine 
resources, but that MBREMP has failed to move from centralized to community based 
management. In a related study, Katikiro et al., (2015b) focus on the five coastal villages within 
MBREMP to examine changes in fishing activities and related social and power structures. They 
highlight how conflict within MBREMP can also be characterized along party lines.  Katikiro 
(2016) examines what happened to alternative livelihood projects initiated by MBREMP in the 
2006-2010 period. His respondents report that projects were allocated inappropriately, they 
did not have clear objectives, and all floundered once donor funding for MBREMP stopped. 
Finally, it is worth reflecting upon a study by Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012). Even though 
their focus is on the Mafia Island Marine Park, they report several dynamics that parallel those 
explained above for MBREMP. Benjaminsen and Bryceson characterize MIMP as exercising 
conservation and centralized control, together with the provision of alternative economic 
activities to entice villagers away from using marine resources. Similar to MBREMP, they report 
some community involvement prior to formation of MIMP, and during the initial period after 
establishment. But later on, participation seems to have been only rhetorical: there are less 
frequent meetings of VLCs with the marine park administration, and implementation of 
conservation rules has become more authoritarian – including instances of heavy-handed 
confiscation of gear. Different from MBREMP, there have been substantial ecotourism 
investments (including some high-end), but these are run by foreign capital and with only 
limited benefits for locals. Like in the case of MBREMP, there is no clarity on how income from 
entry fees is used, and alternative economic activities have not made up for losses in access to 
resources. Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012) argue that a narrative of ‘overfishing’ has been 
used for ‘blue grabbing’ and repressive conservation.  
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4. Beach Management Units 
 
4.1 Background, brief history and main functions of BMUs 
 
BMUs are organizations that seek to facilitate community participation and collaboration in the 
management of coastal resources. BMUs bring together a group of stakeholders (local 
government, community representatives, NGOs, researchers, boat owners, fish traders, and 
money lenders) in a fishing community whose task is to manage, protect and conserve fisheries 
(Sobo 2012). In a BMU, the community is supposed to be the steward of its own resources. The 
Tanzania guidelines for BMUs lists the following tasks: enforce the fishing act, prepare by-laws, 
ensure sanitation and hygiene, collect fish data and information, educate fishers, prepare and 
implement livelihood projects, ensure the security of people and property.  
 
The establishment of BMUs in Tanzania was first implemented on Lake Victoria starting in 1997 
and following the decline in fish catches and stocks (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2015; LVFO, 
2007). The government realized the need to involve local communities in the management of 
fisheries with a view to curb the use of destructive fishing gears, which had led to the depletion 
of fish stocks. Starting in 2006, the implementation of BMUs was extended to the marine 
coastline (Cinner et al., 2012). Coastal BMUs started as pilot projects in Kilwa, Rufiji and Mafia 
Districts under Ministry of Livestock and Fishery Development (currently ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Fisheries) and the MACEP program, in collaboration with WWF Tanzania. The 
formation of BMUs was also emphasized in the Fisheries Act number 22 of 2003. According to 
fisheries regulations, Tanzania is supposed to have 739 Beach Management Units (BMUs) and 
13 Collaborative Fisheries Management Areas. 
 
The fisheries regulations require every person in a village who engages in fishing activities such 
as fishers, fish processors, gear repairers and suppliers, and boat builders to register as 
members of the BMU (URT, 2003). However, as noted from fieldwork visits thus far, there are 
members of BMUs who are actually not engaged in fishing activities. BMU members form their 
own management committees, which usually are composed of thirty people. The BMU 
committee includes five BMU leaders (chairperson, secretary, store-keeper, opinion leader and 
one female representative). The executive committee is made up of fifteen members – five are 
the BMU leaders and the others are ordinary members. BMUs have three other committees: 
the statistics and information committee, consisting of five members; the patrol committee with 
five members; and finance committee with five members. Ideally, every BMU is supposed to 
hold a general assembly quarterly, while BMU committees are supposed to meet once a 
month.   
 
According to section 104 of the Fisheries regulations (URT, 2009), BMUs have the following 
functions: 
i. develop a BMU fisheries management and landing station development plan;  
ii. develop annual and quarterly work plans and budgets to implement the management 
and development plans; 
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iii. collaborate in the collection of fisheries catch, effort and value information; 
iv. engage in monitoring, control and surveillance in such a way to reduce the incidence 
of illegal gears, fishing and fish trading practices within the BMU area; 
v. ensure hygienic, health and safe conditions at the landing stations within the BMU area, 
in accordance with standards set by the Government; 
vi. resolve conflicts; 
vii. participate in selection processes for the issue of fishing vessels license and fishing 
permits within the BMU jurisdictional area to ensure equitable access to resources by 
BMU members; 
viii. ensure timely payment of fisheries licenses and permits fees by members; and 
ix. arbitrate to settle fishery disputes amongst BMU members, between BMUs and 
between the BMU and other institutions. 
 
BMUs are established at the village level and are entrusted with the management of local 
fishing activities – including issuing of licences, collecting landing fees and granting access to 
local marine resources. They are tasked with the management of marine fisheries and operate 
outside of marine protected areas, in parallel to local government institutions. BMUs are a form 
of co-management partnership because communities and all kinds of stakeholders are 
supposed to be the stewards of the resources they exploit.  
The BMU system emphasizes community responsibility and accountability for managing 
resources (Ogwang et al., 2009). Like many other community-based systems for managing 
natural resources, BMUs are supposed to empower local fishing communities to develop and 
enforce locally appropriate rules within village boundaries to improve the management of a 
fishery that has historically suffered from weak management and enforcement (Nunan et al. 
2015).  
Different from the Village Liaison Committees within MPAs, the primary responsibility of BMU 
is to assist fishery officers in law enforcement, landing station development and sanitation, 
collection of fisheries data, conflict resolution and welfare matters (Ogwang et al., 2009). 
However, BMUs are facing challenges in collecting revenue, and are marred by conflicting 
interests between and among members and law enforcement agencies. While BMUs can raise 
revenue, this task is often conflicting with the mandate of the fisheries division. This in turn 
creates conditions for competition and conflict (Nunan et al., 2015). During our preliminary 
fieldwork in coastal areas, we observed that some BMUs have been affected by elites 
occupying more powerful positions within the BMU committees and creating conflict within 
them. Like the VLCs, BMUs are also reported to be affected in terms of gender composition, 
with women often lacking decision-making powers.  
The process of establishing BMUs is ongoing in coastal areas of Tanzania, and is taking place 
mostly in areas where there is active donor support. Considerable progress in forming BMUs 
has been seen in areas outside marine protected areas, for example in areas around Rufiji-
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Mafia-Kilwa (RUMAKI) seascape.11 One of the barriers to BMUs being established in other areas 
is the condition of being registered with the national fisheries department (Nunan et al., 2015), 
which leads some communities to perceive them as an arm of government, thereby hampering 
local active involvement. The emergence of BMUs is also creating tension and conflicts 
between community-based structures such as the Village Environment Management 
Committees (VEMCs), which have substantial overlap of functions and activities.  
4.2 Collaborative Fisheries Management Areas (CFMAs)  
Collaborative Management Areas (CMAs) were first established by the Tanga Coastal Zone 
Conservation and Development Programme (TCZCDP) in 1996. The aim of TCZCDP was to 
address the increasingly unsustainable use of coastal resources (Wells et al., 2010). The 
TCZCDP established six Collaborative Management Areas in Tanga to address the needs of 
resource users. CMAs are based on areas of resource use rather than administrative political 
boundaries, such as villages in relation to BMUs. Under CMAs, management of resources is 
by users accessing fishing grounds shared by a group of villages (Wells et al, 2007). However, 
the CFMAs in Tanga did not prosper, and when the fisheries Act was revised in 2003 the 
concept of BMU was introduced and CMAs shelved (Samoilys and Kayange, 2008). In recent 
years, however, WWF has introduced a different form of CMA in Mtwara, under the term 
Collaborative Fisheries Management Areas (CFMAs), which are managed by a group of 
contiguous BMUs. The condition for establishing CFMAs is that a village should have an 
established BMU, and that the members of BMU committee form a Central Coordinating 
Committee (CCC) for a CFMA. CFMA activities include: carrying out of fish surveys, marking 
of fishing grounds, mapping the water area that belongs to the CFMA, help managing the 
fish camps, and facilitate patrols. There are three operating CFMAs in Mtwara Rural District, 
all set up with WWF support: MNASI (Msanga mkuu, Namela, and Sinde Villages), MKINAI 
(Mgao, Kisiwa, Namgogoli and Imekuwa villages) and MANA (Majengo, Naumbu villages).  
MNASI borders with MBREMP. As a matter of fact, part of the water area demarcated for 
MNASI is also part of the MPA, something that the two organizations will have to resolve, as 
the rules of fishery operation are quite different in the two institutional setups. 
 
CFMAs are established at ward level and ward executive officers are their guardian. They 
have been established so that BMUs can support each other in management issues through 
sharing experiences and skills when they carry out their regular meetings. Each BMU is 
represented in a CFMA by five members. These representatives include the village 
chairperson, the BMU chairperson, the BMU secretary, the Patrol chairperson and a general 
BMU member. They hold meetings every three months. 
																																								 																				
11 RUMAKI includes non-protected areas covering these three coastal districts. It is a globally 
outstanding priority site in the Eastern African Marine Ecoregion. 
http://awsassets.wwf.no/downloads/wwf_tan_rumaki_proposal_011005___main_text.pdf [Accessed on 
16 September 2017] 
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4.3 Insights on coastal BMUs from project documents and the existing literature 
There is little evidence that can be used so far to assess the success of coastal BMU in Tanzania. 
On the one hand, Kuboja (2013) argues that BMUs have been relatively successful as 
community-based marine management structures, and Onyango (2014) claims that they 
improved the registration of fishers and facilitated collection of revenues through licensing. 
On the other hand, Okoth (2015) reports poor performance of BMU in protecting mangrove in 
Bagamoyo district, due to weak by-laws, the importance of social ties in limiting the 
enforcement of rules, community dependence over the resource, and large investments by 
business with permission from higher government authority.    
As for BMUs in inland waters, a study by Luomba (2013) on Lake Victoria indicates that BMUs 
are constrained by insufficient or lack of working tools/equipment and inadequate capacities 
to enforce measures. For example one of the roles of BMU is to reduce resource dependence 
by introducing other income generating activities, but this has not been effectively achieved 
due to inadequate skills and expertise on facilitating these alternative livelihood projects 
(Luomba, 2013). Other activities, however, have been more successful, with fishing operators 
(especially women) establishing revolving funds.  
In general, however, the empirical evidence on the performance of BMUs in Tanzania, and 
especially in coastal areas, is scant. The only study that thoroughly reviews the experience of 
BMUs in coastal marine fisheries in Tanzania is Kanyange et al. (2014), which examined 37 out 
of 204 officially registered BMUs in coastal Tanzania. The stated objectives of this study are: (1) 
to assess the organizational performance of BMUs; (2) verify critical success conditions; (3) 
provide a SWOT analysis; and (4) assess performance of lead government institutions in the 
overall governance of coastal fisheries.  
Kanyage et al. presents results (from interviews and a survey) in highly aggregate terms – at the 
national or regional levels. Their study includes six BMUs in Mtwara region: Senta, Namtibwili, 
Majengo, Mtepwezi and Madaba (Mtwara-Mikindani) and Mgao (Mtwara rural), but does not 
disaggregate results by individual BMU. Yet, several interesting aspects emerge in relation the 
performance of BMUs in Mtwara on aggregate. On processes, they score over the average in 
relation to the proportion of registered executive committees, on quality of communication 
and transparency, on democratic practices, and on ease of conflict resolution. They score 
under the average on quality of BMU institutional structure, number of participants in 
committees, and on level of conflict (higher). On performance, BMUs in Mtwara report a 
perception of decline in fisheries since BMU formation – measured by quantity of fish caught 
per unit, size of fish, total catches, stock and number of fishers. 
It should also be noted that in the past two-three years a perplexing trend has been observed 
in Uganda, where BMUs were first established in the region, following a presidential decree12 
that dissolves BMUs on all the lakes in the country. While it is too early to ascertain the impact 
																																								 																				
12 http://chimpreports.com/museveni-dissolves-beach-management-units/ [Accessed on 29 
November 2017] 
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of this ban, speculation is that Uganda is turning back to the past era, where fisheries 
management relied heavily on a centralized command-and-control and paramilitary approach. 
This will have important effects on group dynamics and community participation for the 700 
BMUs that had been established on Ugandan landing sites.  
4.4 Brief profile of BMUs in Mtwara rural district  
In Mtwara region, BMU formation was supported under the Marine and Coastal Environmental 
Management Plan (MACEMP) from 2008 to 2011. This project was funded by the World Bank 
and WWF. The MACEMP project had four main components: training, support to MPRU, 
alternative livelihoods, and conservation. During the formation of BMUs, village meetings were 
held to discuss their needs and objectives. The introduction of BMUs was not welcome by all 
villagers, with most fishers being resistant to their establishment. Later on, following MACEMP’s 
promises of support to assist fishers with fishing gear and boats, as well as the support of 
alternative income generating activities, villagers eventually accepted their establishment. 
MACEMP supported the establishment of alternative livelihoods projects, such as goat 
breeding, poultry rearing, and fish farms. Unfortunately, a considerable number of BMUs were 
not effective in implementing the management guidelines and hence have become inactive. 
In 2014, WWF started a process of re-vamping BMUs, especially those established by 
MACEMP, and is carrying out training sessions with both villagers and BMU leaders to build 
their capacities in managing BMUs. WWF also facilitated the formation of new BMUs in 2016.  
Other NGOs such as KIMWAM, AFRICARE and Aghakhan Foundation also implement activities 
in BMU areas, aiming to reduce overdependence on fishery resources. They provide trainings 
on alternative income generating activities such chicken and goats keeping, also raise 
awareness on sustainable use of fishery resources. These NGOs also assisted in the 
establishment of some Village Community Banks (VICOBAs).  
In our preliminary fieldwork, we observed that one of the main challenges facing BMUs in their 
operations is low capability in terms of equipment, such as patrol boats, materials and security 
personnel to enable them to conduct routine patrols. Support from the district council has not 
been forthcoming as initially envisaged. Moreover, there is mistrust between villagers/fishers 
and district officials and this hugely affects the effectiveness of BMU patrols. Villagers are not 
comfortable to call district fishery officers in case of observed breaches of fishing regulations.  
The relationship between leaders and illegal fishers also is a challenge in implementing BMU 
objectives. This is because when illegal fishers are found or caught by BMU leaders, they are 
supposed to be taken to the village government office, but because of social ties they are rarely 
punished. 
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5. Knowledge gaps and next steps  
5.1 Knowledge gaps 
In this NEPSUS working paper, we have shown that MPAs and BMUs are important instruments 
of co-management of coastal resources in Tanzania. Although they were designed with 
community participation in mind, they face serious challenges. One of the most important is 
that they limit or regulate access to resources without having been able to facilitate meaningful 
livelihood alternatives, thus undermining the initial trust-building efforts that had been carried 
out through donor and NGO support. As in many other instances of natural resource 
partnerships, local community participation is embedded in local power structures, with little 
meaningful participation by local communities and instances of elite capture. We have also 
observed how little is known about how BMUs have functioned in practice in coastal Tanzania, 
while more baseline information is available for MPAs, including MBREMP. Finally, there has 
been no attempt so far to systematically assess the functioning and impacts of MPAs and BMUs 
and to compare these two substantially different partnership structures.  
In future activities of the NEPSUS project, as concerns coastal resources, we pick up these 
challenges. As explained in our overall conceptual paper (Ponte et al., 2017), we focus in 
particular on different configurations of partnership complexity and how it affects the ability to 
deliver sustainability outcomes. We have shown how the literature on natural resource 
management is mostly silent on this issue. Some knowledge on complexity is available in terms 
of the problems to be tackled, showing the importance of the interconnectedness of natural 
and social components of systems that partnerships are targeting. At the same time, we have 
reported literature arguing that the complex nature of conservation problems enables 
powerful actors to pit policies against each other in order to elbow out groups that fight against 
the appropriation of natural resources for the benefit of political and business elites. Therefore, 
it is relevant to examine how different representations of complexity influence how 
partnerships work and to what end.   
Another form of complexity that has been highlighted in the literature relates to the structure 
of partnerships – in terms of form of interaction between actors and type of organizational 
membership. Some actors have daily interactions, while others are involved only in specific 
meetings. Actors are involved differently over time and at different levels of the partnership 
process. Some members are involved as individuals, while others represent organizations. 
Actors comes and go, and policies and strategies change over time (see review in Ponte et al. 
2017).  
What is missing in these literatures is an understanding of complexity in its constituent 
elements – in terms of numbers of institutions and partners involved, their diverse background 
(for profit, social enterprise, not for profit, government, network), the multiple scales they 
operate at, and their different core interests. Many contributions examine participation, 
transparency, accountability, power relations, resource flows – but we still lack a better 
understanding of the connections between these factors and how different kinds of complexity 
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may affect actual sustainability outcomes. Network complexity is also seldom examined locates 
partnerships in broader structures of ties that not only channel resources but also shape power 
asymmetries and outcomes.  
5.2 Research questions 
NEPSUS research activities will address these gaps by unpacking complexity in and around 
sustainability partnerships on coastal resources and by linking its constitutive elements to 
sustainability outcomes. Research will also unpack participation by focusing on critical 
examination of factors that influence the legitimacy of different forms of partnerships, and 
examine whether the rhetoric supporting the presence of many actors in sustainability 
partnerships pans out in terms of results, given that actors may be of very different nature and 
pursue different objectives.  
The relevant research questions guiding this effort are the following (see Ponte et al., 2017):  
RQs1: Complexity  
• What factors account for different degrees of complexity in partnerships for natural 
resource governance?  
• In what local, national and international contexts have these partnerships arisen?  
• What kinds of social networks are woven around them? 
 
RQs2: Processes   
• How do different kinds of partnerships develop, gain and manage legitimacy among 
different audiences and stakeholders?  
• What kinds of legitimacy (input, process, output) do they seek and how? And which 
forms of legitimacy, if any, provide most power to local communities? 
• How does the history of relations between state, local communities, private and 
international actors influence participatory processes and interactions and power 
relations among actors?  
• What processes, if any, are successful in preventing powerful actors (public or private) 
from capturing the partnership process to suit their own interests? 
• What learning processes (if any) are taking place that may allow late-comers to leverage 
positive lessons and/or avoid the pitfalls of previous experiences? 
 
RQs3: Sustainability outcomes   
• What are the environmental, socio-economic/livelihood outcomes in partnerships with 
different configurations of complexity, and in different resource systems? How are these 
effects distributed among different groups of actors? 
• What are the synergies and/or trade-offs between socio-economic and environmental 
outcomes? What features minimize trade-offs and maximize synergies between them?  
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• What instances of conflict and cooperation have emerged as a result of these 
partnerships? In which cases have relations of domination between state 
administrations and local communities been transformed?  
 
5.3 Research design and site selection 
The research design to assess sustainability partnerships in coastal resources is built upon two 
layers of comparison: (1) between ‘simpler partnerships’ (SP), ‘more complex partnerships’ 
(CP), and ‘control’ (C) sites — selected in contiguous areas that are as agro-ecologically and 
socio-economically similar as possible; and (2) between ‘early-mover’ (EM) and ‘latecomer’ (L) 
sites (see Table 2). The logic of comparing EM and L sites is to assess whether the latter were 
able address some of the challenges (but also learn from successes) previously experienced in 
EM sites. Finally, secondary databases and results from previous and current research projects 
and community baseline surveys will be used, when available, to build ‘before-after’ 
comparisons. We selected eight sites in Mtwara rural district (see Table 3): MBREMP is a case 
of ‘simpler partnership’ because it is more top-down in nature (even though it has elements of 
community participation) and has a relatively simpler configuration of actors. We selected 
BMUs as examples of more complex partnerships and inactive BMUs as control sites.  
Table 2: Complexity scoring for NEPSUS case studies 
Table	1:	Preliminary	complexity	scoring	for	site	selection	
Institutional	setup Forest	
reserves
CBFM	+	FSC	
certification
None Game	reserves WMAs None Marine	parks BMUs	+	CFMAs None
Complexity	factors
Number	of	actors medium high medium high medium high
Number	of	actor	categories low high low high medium high
Complexity	of	the	decision	making	
system low high low high medium high
Degree	of	sharing	among	different	
actor	categories	in	access	rights	to	the	
resource low high low high medium medium
Complexity	scoring simpler more	complex control simpler more	complex control simpler	 more	complex control
Coastal	ResourcesForestry Wildlife
Source: Ponte et al. (2017) 
We selected four villages within MBREMP to be able to cover all three main agro-ecological 
areas (seafront, mangrove and riverine), and to include experiences from villages that had 
joined the marine park early in its establishment (in 2002) and in a second wave of expansion 
(in 2005-07). For coastal resources, the comparison across SP, CP and control sites is carried 
out only for the coastal villages, given that the other two MBREMP villages have significantly 
different livelihood portfolios and resource use patterns (see Table 3). 
The two selected BMUs are located near the MPA and that have similar agro-ecological 
conditions to the coastal villages within MBREMP: Msanga Mkuu and Namela. Together with 
a third BMU (Sinde, not selected), they constitute the MNASI Collaborative Fishery 
Management Area (CFMA). These villages established their BMUs more or less at the same 
time, thus we do not differentiate between early-movers and latecomers (we do so in relation 
to villages within MBREMP). The two sites selected as control (Kisiwa and Mgao) are coastal 
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villages which do not have an active BMU, and are located in areas of similar agro-ecological 
conditions to the two BMU sites and the two coastal villages within MBREMP. 
Table 3: Site selection  
Simpler partnership (SP) More complex partnership (CP) Control sites 
4 sites within MBREMP 2 active BMUs and their CFMA 2 inactive BMU 
Msimbati (coastal/early-mover) 
Mkubiru (coastal/latecomer) 
Namidondi (mangrove) 
Muhuranga (riverine) 
Namela, Msanga Mkuu  
(MNASI CFMA) Kisiwa, Mgao 
4 2 2 
 
Figure 1: Location of selected sites in Mtwara rural district  
Source: modified from Harding (2005) 
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